However, the agreement was unable to end the civil war for several reasons. First, the NPFL continued its “spoiler role” by not sticking to the condition that all hostilities be stopped. The reason was that his main request had still not been met. Second, and with respect to ECOMOG, the peacekeeping force that has taken certain enforcement actions, they have not been sufficient to fully enforce the NPFL. In other words, ECOWAS did not yet have the political will to carry out the peace agreement. This was because neither the organization nor the international community was prepared to use military means to compel the NPFL to comply with the conditions, particularly in terms of security, of the peace agreement. Derouen Jr., Karl, Bercovitch, Jacob and Wei, Jun, “Duration of Peace and Recurrent Civil Wars in Southeast Asia and the Pacific,” Civil Wars, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2009): 103-120. Concerned about the negative effects of the war on sub-regional security, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the sub-regional organization, intervened in the conflict, including through a peace-building approach to various peace agreements.
However, the first sixteen peace agreements could not end the war. Finally, the Abuja II peace agreement put an end to the bloodshed. What were the factors behind these results? The first sixteen peace agreements were deficient in one or more elements that need to be addressed in order to successfully implement a peace agreement, from the “spoiler phenomenon” to the lack of implementation. On the other hand, the success of the Abuja II peace agreement was established in the fact that the necessary measures were taken to ensure the effective implementation of the battery of the elements necessary for success. For example, the inexhaustible role of the Taylor-led NPFL as a spoiler was evoked by the reluctance of Burkina Faso and Côte d`Ivoire, the two main supporters of the warlord militia, to continue to accept obstruction of the peace process within the war group. In addition, ECOWAS has developed a political will to enforce the agreement, including the threat of creating a war crimes tribunal. Fearon, J. D., – Laitin, D.D. (2003). Ethnicity, insurrection and civil war.
The American Political Science Review, 97 (1), 75-90. What has happened is that the extension of the war, and especially the availability of natural resources and the possibility of securing positions within the various transitional governments, have encouraged the formation of new war-order militias. Thus, from 1992, new war factions – the Liberian Peace Council, the Defence Force and the Central Revolutionary Council of the NPFL – and ULIMO broke into two factions (ULIMO-J under The leadership of Roosevelt Johnson and ULIMO-K under Alhaji Kromah). In short, each emerging war group obeys an interesting “logic”: the confiscation of territories with natural resources has led to the possibility of accumulating private assets and to the immediate recognition by ECOWAS as a player in the conflict.